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WORKING IN SENATOR MCCARTHY'S C~PAIGN quickly gives one a sense
of having landed in a science-fiction fantasy world, You thiink you know
where, when, and what you're doing, but things tend to <I1issolve at the
limits of perception, lending a shimmer of unreality. Mc<I:arthy's Presidential effort has not really been a campaign in the normal and traditional sense. Rather, it has been a sort of national Happening, bringing
the strangest of fellows to bed, assaulting common sense, and' assailing
logic with ultimate abandon.
,
McCarthy shouldn't have been ~unning for the Presidlel!cy at aJl. It
defied every tradition in the history books ,and upset th~ normal machinations of Democratic politics throughout the country. And if McCarthy does not now get the n~mination of hi~ party, 'dfspite leading
the popular polls, the reason wIll be apparent III the wr~ckage of the
party structure about him. The "movement" the Senator brought forth
£tom the body politic has, from the point of view o~:, the warty regulars,
grown into a rampaging virus rubbing rawly at every synapse of the
traditional political structure.
\.'
~ Even politicians who would not mind seeing McCarthy elected
President are terrified at the prospect of hundreds and thousands of.
McCarthy troopers storming ,into pr(:cinct caucuses, up~tting plans'
and structures which required generations to construct. '
'Politicians are, by nature, somewhat less than the most imaginative
members of society. Their normal bent is to seek security in formalized
struchues held together by patronage. The Kennedy brothers clevel- ,
,opec(l tpe art of dangling postmasterships before local chieftains, and
the ~uccess of the Kennedys is enough evidence that it is not your
idedlogy or the style of your campaign which upsets the local minions
of the party. Rather, it is how you play the game. The statie Democratic
chairman of Iowa, for instance, went on record to the effect that an
"Un-American" invasion had turned his precinct and count}! caucuses
inside out and wroug,ht havoc throughout the state. Who were these '
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un-American conspirators? They were the people of Iowa, the rank and
file, many attending a caucus for the first time in their lives. .
In the process, of course, the rank and file did not stop at;the discovery of the mechanics qf party politics. They went on to throw out
county chairmen, eleet new and unknown committeemen, and threaten
the very foundation of the traditional system.
Rare is the politician capable of anticipating such a development, of
,reading the runes on the wall and moving accordingly. Such a rare one
~iS Filo Sedillo, longtime chairman of Valencia County, New MexiCo.
Sedillo can hardIt be called a brash upstart, yet his votes provided the
, ,margin which produced a victory for proportional representation and
I;letted McCarthy 45% of the delegation at th6New Mexico State Convention. Whatever happens in the future, Sedillo and his crew will
be in the middle of it. But more typicany~ the tradition~bound county
chairmen and local political leaders in every ~tate reacted, to the McCarthy movement with somewhat the same em:otions they might feel
in the presence of the Black Plague.
I have no idea what will become of the McGarthy "movement." But
I am certain that it is far more important than any of the issues raised
in the campaign to date~mdre;importantthan early settlement oAthe
war, more important than relief for the ghettos, and far more impor, tant than the solution of the balance of payments proble~. For -in a_
way the problem 6f the ghettos am} the poor is linked closely: witlr
McCarthy's middle-class movement, though perhaps only a few Blacfs.
see it that way. And the exasperation ~nd helplessnes~ so painful'to-the
youth of the prosperous middle classrtJ.1ough we caIhhe problepl "alienation," is not, at base, mu'ch differentfrom the disfranch'iscment-of.the
'''' black man and the urban poor.
'
Assortedl Swedes and Frenchmen have been warning us for years that
our inherently most difficult problem 'will be the adaptation of dern.ocra.cy to a technological cmlture with ;:l population of hundreds of millions. Today, however, it is not only the Black and the poor and the
young who feel powerless to affect the machinations of the system. In
the last half of the 20th centu~ the smog-bound, tax-hounded, and
radar-trapped subu0anite also feels qlSt adrift in a sea of technocracy
I
where no one cares and, worse, no one listens.
_
, To my'way of thinking, the fail,ure of the s~tem to provide'a mechanism for the people to involve themselves, in the ordering of ,government and society is more to blame for riots, arson al)dcrime waves than
any immediate economic and social &privation. And George Wallace
1
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is ev~ry bit as much the benefactor of this upwelling ofjrustration ~s. ,
is McCarthy.
"
When Senator McCarthy developed the gall to toss is previously ,
untrampl.ed hat into the New Hampshire ring, I 'am sure hrhad little if ,
any notion that by his act he would arouse the unbounde energies of
countless'numbers of persons from:all w~lks of life':-po Clll of them
young-who had been searching, i~ tmconsciously, :for*lome way,to
make their mark on the social fabric.
:
At this writing, the campaign has done so well t~at cCart1Jy no
longer considers it "his" but rather the embodiment of th yearning of
millions to participate, to have a voice in the ordering of ~heir society. Time will show what will happen and the political ana!lysts will tell
us what it means. One element,seems most obvious: Americans want
relev;mt government substructures in which they can 'participatedirectly. This does not ,necessarily imply that the federal government
should be dismantled, for the stateand.Iocal governments Qf the country are uniformly less representat\ve and less adaptive than the federal.
Decentralization itself may not be the answer, if i~ res,ults only in
spreading the same problems. In some way we need ne'w institutions
to which the electorate can relate.
jPerhaps, ultimately, the message of the mass ,movement aroused by
M'CCarthy will lead to the presentation of plans to redr~w state lines
to: make them relevant; to establish regional substructurles; to abolish
cd$nties; or any number of <:>ther previously wild-sounding: notions. But
,tlie verdict is clear: Americans,. though they may not have a precise
n~tion of what they want, are fed tlP with govc;:rnment by negotiation
between interest groups and profession.al POI.iticians. Th~~' is not to say
that "politician" must remain a dirtyl word. The Cree s considered
politics the highest of the' arts of man. So does McCa hy, and the
results of his efforts imply clearly that many of us, would ~ike to accord
politicians that regard, were-it pos~ible.
,I'
Whatever the Senator's future, whether he is elected iPr~sident, Of
whether he even returns to the Senate, he has already mad~ this singular
contribution: he has given "yoice to the aspirations of America, and'
America will never be the same.
>
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I first heard that M'cCarthy would become a genuine Fandida,te for
the Presidency in November of 1967,
considerably befOlre
the formal
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announcement' and .long before many took 'the idea seriously (many

48

,

still don't).
.
I hear~ it from an unusual sour<~e, a man, who was virtually an
unknown, yet a man who may be one of the prime movrrs in seeking
a new kind of America in the years to come. His name is Allard}aowen\ stein, and I found him resPlendent in his usual dirty windbreaker and
-T-shirt in the student union at the University of Nebra'ska in Lincoln.
He carried a lumpy, monstrous bag, full of assorted propaganda and
ancient inscrutable tracts, but a bag certain to contain a "speech.
making" coat and tie somewhere in its intenninable depths.
Lowenstein h?d come to the university in his capacity as leader of the
n,ewly fonned "Dump Johnson Movement." This was not his name for
it ~ut that supplied by the press. which at that time regar~ed Lowenstem as fit only for a leprosarium.
.
An early president of the National, Student Associati'on, Al had
fought the far left in the formative years of the cou,ntry's national union
of students, then fought bitterly to prevent NSA's fall into the arms
of the Central Intelligence Agency. Meanwhil,e, he ,smuggled himself
and associates in and out ofSouthwest Africa, wrote a book about that,
.came to be close to Eleanor Roosevelt and Adlai Stevenson,aild served
on Hubert Humphrey's staff as an advi~or on inten!ational affairs. I
came to know Lowenstein through NSA, to which he often returned
to regale the youngsters wit;h marvelous stories and passionate pleas for
social justice. A truly outstanding public speaker, he moves audiences
as no 'one else in modem America.
In a way, Lowenstein invented the McCarthy move~ent, for it \vas
he who acted as the catalyst to 'bring ,aimless frustrations and rancor'
,,into the political system and poin~ the way to~ard effective and affirm'ative.effort. Few others beli~ved it could be done, and in San Francisco
.,. there was talk of blowing up Pacific Gas and Electric as the only way
to get the ~tablishmentto pay attention. .
,
The response to Lowenstein's effort was o.verwhelming, ip the sense
that it drew far more response from a much wider group than anyone
hadtanticipat~d. His effort led first to McCarthy's decision tllat it might
pe possible to do something by running in New Hampshire, and then to
the evocation of that mass movement wltich we now think o( as McCarthy's movement-though the Senator himself keeps attempting to
explain that it is obviously no one's' movement, that he is 'as much its
follower as its leader.
Lowenstein's New York organization grew by leaps an~ bounds
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it was capable of running full-page ad~n the Sunday Times. The
rising bitterness against the Johnson Administration so impressed those
who happened to be watching that it quickly became obviious this was
no ordinary fractious splinter wing of New York Reform Democrats
I
but a genuine force to be reckoned with.
McCarthy was, watching,' and listening tQ the reports of his own
.college-age children, predictably in the thick of it. When tHe effort grew
to respectable proportions, McCarthy brought' his hock~y stick down
from the attic and set out for the snows of New Hampshj*. ;
But the movement, as seems to be the fate of all social I ~pstitutions, '.
quickly became the victim of Parkinson's inescapable laws of bUjl"eaUr~t'
cratic behavior. Internal.mechanisms proliferated and empire-bui1ding
set in,until chaos became the norm at National McCart~y fOT President Headquarters. By the time the n~wborn "organ~tion" had
moved into its quarters in the Transportation Building in Washington's business district, three identifiable battalions had jIined up to
fight for contJ:ol, with nebulous and shifting sub-groups ~formation
each hour of the day.
,
,
~
The first and foremost, of the squads invelved in the, s~rife was, of
course, th~ .Lowenstein-oriente? Confere?ce of Conc~~ned De~o:. cratsjCoahtlOn for a DemocratIc AlternatIve group, whI<J:h felt, WIth
some justice, th~t it had invented the, whole thi?g. Se~ond,jMcCarthy's
Senate staff got mto the act, somewhat wondenngly and shghtly aghast
at the prospect of having tObwork with a group of urban 'ladicals over
which it had no apparent control. I
"
"
Relations between these twO' groups took on a curious pattern bearing some resemblance to the Paris negotiations with the North Vietr
namese, where ~IDissaries and messages are sent back and forth accord- ,
: ing to formal protocol but fruitful discussions have to w~t for coffee
I breaks and cocktail parties.
J
,
Thi1rd, a national staff coalesced out of the washin1n nebulae,
devel~ping its own independent stake in the affair~f the over-all
I ,operatIon.
_
! '. S~ll i~. the proce~s of formation at that time was a facti(1)n of unprei
dlcta~le Import whIch later became the key to much of thf campaIgn:
the student army, headed by Sam Brown, a Harvard divi,ity student
wl10 had. only recently lost a narrow' contest for the presidency of the
N~.tiqnal~tudentAssociation. ~llied with Brown and his 9ohortswere
the Washmgton student.es~bhshments of NSA and the tr.s.Student
Pr¢ss Association, which by that time, had' turned its Cpllege Press
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Service in'to a virtual anti-Vietnam and pro-McCarthy propaganda
organ. This, incidentally, created great difficulties for the studen~ press:
:large university members were calling for more vitriol~ while sm~ller
members pleaded for mercy.
. Historians may find it interesting that Lowei1stein )Vas the first' to
bite the dust as the campaign took form. The voluble, energetic and
boisterous New Yorker was more than McCarthy's nerves could take,
The Senator cannot tolerate table-thumpers, and Low~nsfein m~
the last of the great thumpers.
~
Early in,December at the Chicago Confer,ence of Concerned D roocrats, calkd essentially by Lowenstein, to launch the M.cCarthy cam_. paign, Lowenstein delivered a shouting, podium-pounping ,assau t on
the Johnson administration which brought the audience tQ ~ts fee and
to the' verge of taking to the barricades. All of this appaUea the 'mild
Senator from Minnesota, who vowed he would never agairr appear on
the same platform with Lowenstein. This was unfortunate, to say the
least. Lowenstein's brilliance and unique ability to int~ract with people
at all levels might have brought a greater coherence to the campaign
and avoided some of the staff-shuffling which afflicted it fight through
the California primary in June.
.
To head his national campaign staff, McCarthy picked Blair Clark,
an ex-CBS News executive. A genial man with the most affable of'
manners, Clark is in the McCarthy image, and wouldn't conceive of
pounding a table or raising his voice. But beipg a journalist first and an
intellectual second, Clark proved no more capable of arranging the
logistics ,and mechanics of a national campaigll than I would. His role, .
albeit a very important one, has been that of front man for the
campaign, presenting the proper image to the press apd public.
Into the organizati.on gap stepped Curtis "Curt'" Gans, another
product of national student politics, in this case by wayof the Univer·
sity of North Carolina, United Press International, and a stint,on the
staff of Americans for Democratic Action. -Gans is a unique individual,
and <me of the few humans able to subsist on a steady diet of Coca Cola
and cigarettes. His intensity is such that he radiates a field of acute
discomfort of sufficient magnitude to prqduce squirms and twitches for
blocks. Originally a participant in Lowenstein's effort to establish Support for an anti-administration position among DeJ110crats throygh0ut
the country, Gans eve.ntually assu~ed the position ~f chief of~taff in
the ~cCarthy campaIgn. Meanwhile, he had gone mto NewiHamp-

'
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shire wheq':things WJ1re toughest, marshalled the students amd arranged
the logisti~alpattern t~at was to bring off the headline-prodtcing result
for McCa~thy.
".
"
The st4dent troops were perhaps the key to New Hampshire. Perhaps. Th4 youth of -the country materialized out of thin ir in New,
Hampshire, coming by the busload, hitchiking, driving six 0 a Volksf wagen, even walking, to do anything they could, to help
Gans and
Brown organized the chaotic multitude into an effective fo e.
But still-::-perhaps. lIn retrospect it, is very difficult to' as ess the impact of the volunteer student army in New Hampshire, or in any of the
primaries. It may well.be that New Hampshire, like much10f the rest
of the country, was i~'hing for a chance to repudiafe the Jphnson administration's inept idance of 'foreign affairs-or, e~enmore likely,
wa~ appreciative of th ' opportunity to repudiate the tradidonal pOlitical system in general by voting for an "aI;lti-politician" who,Jppeated to
be running in defiance of the normal order.of things as muc~ as running
for the Presidency. With hindsight, it appears to me that ' cCarthY's
good fortune in New Hampshire, and later in Oregon, rest d more.on
his utilization of the mass media to present himself as a cog nt alternative to the :exisring situation and as an agent for alteration of he system,
than it did on mass canvassing or any amount of committe formation
or block and ward work. Re,gardless, the mass campaign 'effort did '
pr,ovide a~ involvement mechanism for thousands of you g people,
including some who had been on the verg~ of dropping ut of the
system altogether, and even a few who had toyed with viole t methods
to jolt society from its complacency. The McCarthy effoi't offered all
Qf them a means to make a dent in the social fabric withou rending it
, ~yond repair.
'
Should the result of this year's electoral process be simply the as-predlcted nomination of Humphrey and Nixon, tany of the~ ollngsters
wip, no doubt, plunge back into the depths q>f desp~ir, and the arguments of the Bay Area anarchists will gain new strength. Bpt, I hope,
~ significant number will come away with the feeling that tl\.ough they
may not have won the complete battle, their efforts contriputed to ,a
remarkable shift iItnational policy.
,
'
"
I
It is difficult now to recall the dark days of last fall, when tpc,country
seemed locked into a doomed spiral of escalation and killing ih Vi~tnam
and it appeared virtually impossible for the individual A~lerican to
! find a way to express his outrage through regular channels.
,
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Things have changed. Drastically. No matter who is II:0minated in
August, the America. of the fall of 1965·will be aimed down a far different road than it was ~ year pr~viously.
I
•

III

,

I

Nebraska is an odd place for a transplanted New Mexibn tb find
himself. When first offer d a job in the state, I hesitated~' telling the
employer frankly that,' there is a capital of the Flat Earth Society, it
must be in Nebraska. was, right about that, as it turned out. But the
job was too'good to ass up, so early in 1967 I landed in the Meat
Packing Center of the orld.
,-,
That I found mysel directing the Nebraska McCarthy campaign
effort "after only a year there speaks eloquently of the political condi·
tions in this forlorn and often forgoften prairie state. The fact was;'
qpite simply, that there was no one else with an established position
of some respect in the state willing to lend his name, to the cause. There
still isn't.
)
Kennedy's agents found not ample but sufficient numbers of henchmen in Nebraska, som<s.left over from past disasters (Nixon stomped
JFK by 'a landslide in Nebraska-it was Nixon's best state), some
attracted to the glories of Camelot, and some smelling postmast~hips
in the air. The Kennedy supporters included a few hardened pros who
thought they saw the handwriting on the wall and hoped to line up on
the winning side. They remained generally conservative Democrats
in a party10ng intimidated by the overwhelming Repu:blicanism of the
state. Augmented by teenyboppers, they were able to erect a passable
facade, pump it·full of cash (almost entirely from o~tside Nebraska),
_
and mount a respectable campaign.
But the McCarthy forces could tum up not,hing more thana few
colJege students and an occasional professor. Not a single politician in
the state was· ready to lay his career on the line for McCarthy-as Curt
Gans found out in pointed terms.
Gans made the first entre into Nebraska. His aggressive demeanor
and Eastern inte~sity evoked a negative response among Nebraska
politicians of such vehe~ence that, after a year in the state, I w~till
, hard put to explain it. One young lawyer, a liberal Democrat (in
Nebraska ~erms) and a potential Congressional candidate, claimed he
threw Gans out of his office.
As a result, the Senator's campaigns picked up steam in every state
except Nebraska (Indiana, though, was almost as bad), without a,single

)
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Nebraskan of any importance willing to lend even his name much less
work or money, to the effort.
,.
Part of the explanation for' this hismal state of affairs ies ·in the
nature of Nebraska's headlong rush toward, total entropy. Once, the
home of Midw~ern radicalism (now only dimly re mbered),
Nebraska was destroyed politically by the Depression and e political
exorcism to which it was subjected. in the thirties. During hose hard
years when plains ranchers were baling tumbleweed to ~eed gaunt
--cattle, a l~rge proportion of Nebraska's younger citizens. ttok off for
greener pastures in the West. Interestiagly, I met numbers of Nebraskans in Otegon, especially in east Slope irrigated farming ars, most of
whom vo-ived they would never return, except perhaps to . isit grandmother.~
,
In the ensuing tpree decades Nebraska became a place, i 'the words
of embittered ex-Nebraskan T~d Sorensen, "young men lea e and old
men~go t&die.'· Poignantly, Nebraska's famous men of the day are all
expatriates, the So~ensens among them. Denizens of the state poipt to
. Johnny GFon an~ assnrted .lesser Inminaries as the product of the
Comhuskfr State-none of whom has seen fit to make a ilife in his
native domain.
Nebras~a's newspapers and e.ducators 'recurrently decry he "brain
drain" wh.\ich cripples the economy and afflicts the cuItu life, and '
resolve to! mend the situation by creating new oPPortu~ities. 'But
seldom if ~ver does the resolve take concrete form. Salaries .are lower
than ii neighboring industrial areas, spending on educati n lags far
behind, arid money for public works is almost unheard of. 1fhose who
remain behind' fall essentially into two categories: those r.vho have
"made it"1. either by inheritance or good fortune, an.d those tho don't
have the money or the courage to strike out for new horizons
Obviously, a society where the power structure is ,compose of those
with a vested interest in theJstatus quo, and where all dissidents are
removed Qy exmigration, will not change at a particularly r~pid ,pace.
This is noir to say that there are no Nebraskans who long for their state
to get bac~ in step with the rest of the world. But they are few and far
between; tpey tend to become embittered and eventually throw in the
towel and Ihead for the rnameless suburban streets of Sunnyf.ale, California, or ~he like. Virtually all Nebraskans seem to be sa~.ng up to
retire in sOfrne other clime-preferably as soon as possible.
'
Omaha,'that astounding unmetropolis on the Missouri, is t the fore
of enervation. An urb which never quite grew into a city,
aha" i self
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Things have changed. Drastically. No matter who is nominated in
August, the Amedca of the fall of i968'Yill be aimed down a far different road than it was a year previously.
-

III
Nebraska is an odd place for a transplanted New Mexican to find
himself. When first offered a job in the state, I hesitated, telling the
employer frankly that if there· is a capital of the Flat Earth Society, it
must be in Nebraska. I was right about that, as it turned out. But the
job was, too good to pass up, so early in 1967 I landed in the Meat
. Packing Center of the World.
That 1 found myself directing the Nebraska McCartbi caPlpaign
effort after only a year there speaks eloquently of the pol'itical-conditions in this forlorn and often forgotten prairie state. The fact was,'
quite simply, that there was Ito one else with an established position
of some respect in the state willing to lend his name to the cause. There
still isn't.
Kennedy's agents found not ample but sufficient numbers of henchmen in Nebraska, some'left over from past disasters (Nixon stomped
JFK by a landslide in Nebraska..:....it was Nixon's best state), some
attracted to the glori.es of Camerot, and some smelling postmasterships
in the air. The Kennedy supporters included a few hardened pros who
thoughtthey saw the handwriting on the wall and hoped to line up on
the winning side. They remained generally conservative Democrats
in a party long intimidated by the overwhelming Republicanism of the
state. Augmented by teenyboppers, they w~re able to erect a passable
- facade, pump it full of cash (almost entirely from outside ;Nebraska),
and mount a respectable'campaign.
But the McCarthy forces could turn up nothing more than a few
~llege students· and an occasional professor. Not a single politician in
the state was ready to lay his career on the line for McCarthy-as Curt
Cans found o~t in pointed terms.
i
Cans made the first entre into Nebraska. His aggressive demeanor
and Eastern intensity evoked a negative response among Nebraska
politicians of such vehemence that, after a year in the state;· I was still
hard put to explain it. One young lawyer, a liberal Democrat (in
Nebraska terms) and a potential Congressional candidate, claimed he
threw Gans out of his office.
As a result, the Senator's campaigns picked up steam in every state
except Nebraska (Indiana, though, was almost as bad), without a single
<
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Nebraskan of any importance willing to lend even his name, Imuch less
work or mimey, to the effort.,
:
Part of the explanatio'n for this dismal state of affairs Hes ·in the
nature oe~ebraska's headlong rush toward total entroPY'f·nce the
home of Midwestern' radicalism (now only dimly rem mbered),
Nebraska was destroyed politically by. the Depression and th political
exorcism to which it was subjected in the thirties. During t ose hard
years when plains ranchers were baling tumbleweed to feed gaunt
cattle, a large.proportion of Nebraska's younger citizens to~k off for
greener pastures in the West. Interestingly, I met nqmbers 9f Nebraskans in Oregon, especially in east slope irrigated farming areas, most of
whom vowed they would never return, except perhaps to v~it
grandI
mother.~
.
In th.e ensuing t~ree decades' Nebraska be:ame a pla,ce, in he words
of emhlttered ex-Nebraskan Ted Sorensen, 'young men lea and old
: men~go tOt die." Poignantly, Nebraska's famous men of the <fay are all
i expatriates, the Sorensens amongJhem. Denizens of t~e statt point to
I Johnny ca. rson and assorted lesser luminaries as the prOd:.t ~f th.e
. Comhusker State-none of whom has seen fit to make a Ife In hIS
native domain.
.
Nebraska's newspapers and educators recurrently decry t e "brain
~drain" which cripples the economy and afflicts the cultura life, and
i resolve to mend the 'situation by creating new opportunities. But
I seldom if ever does the resolve take concrete form. Salaries are lower
than in neighboring industrial areas, spending oil education lags far·
behind, and money for public works is almost unheard of. Those who
remain behind fall essentially into two categories: those who harve
I "made it," either by inheritance or good fortune, and those who don't
I have the money or the courage to strike out for new horizons.
Obviou~ly, a society where the power structure is composed of those
with a ves~ed interest in the status quo, and where all dissidents are
removed by exmigration, will not change at a particularly rapid pace.
i This is not to say that there are no Nebraskans who long for their state
, to get bac¥. in step with the rest of the world. But the.y are ,f9w and far
betw.-een; they tend to become embittered and eventually thrrw in the
towel and head for the nameless suburban str~ets of SunnY'{ale, California, :or the like. Virtually.all Nebraskans seem ~o be savuig up to
retire in some other clime-preferably as soon as ·possible. .
Omaha, that astounding unmetropoli~ on the Missouri, is aIt the core
of enervation. ~n ~rb which never quite grew into a.city, 01aha itself
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is composed o~ thousands of transplants from the desiccated small'
towns of NeQraska and Iowa. A large proportion of its-residents, particularly young executives and professionals, see it only as a temporary
water~ng hole on the long trek to a more ,civilized place. Needless to
say, it is more difficult to mobilize political activity in a situation where
the majority of the population couldn't care less.
Those Omahans who remain behind, those who have little hope of
.departing for. California or Ihorida, gr9w d'eeply resentful of those who)
can pick up stakes. In turn,1 they become increasingly etpbittered and
. hostile towards the rest of the country and its problems, particularly the
eastern seaboard.
For years Nebraska took immense pride in being the "white spot"
of the nation, with no income tax and no sales tax, financing myriad
tiny school districts stricti y from local property taxes. The one-room
school house with the non-degreed teacher has persisted longer in
Nebraska than anywhere else in the nation. As a result, Nebraskans
don't know 'a great deal about the outside world, and don't especially
desire to find out. In this most of their news media reinforce them
daily. The Omaha World-Herald covers Nebraska and much of western ,
Iowa like a blanket. A wet blanket. The paper's prejud~ces and jaundiced world outlook are so inbred and traditional that its haff -wembers
are no longer aware,of it. Dozens of fairly talented young men toil daily
in its stifling mold, under the misapprehension that they are part of a
great metropolitan daily. Television in Nebraska is also thoroughly un·
. imaginative and it follows where the World-Herald leads, reinforcing
Nebraskans' fears and prejudices abou\ the real world o~tside their
boundaries. Even the state's seven educational TV stations fall under
this pall.
Partisan politics were destroyed in Nebraska during the thirties, and
have never recovered. Though the non-partisan League and many
weird offshoots of populism flourished throughout the plains states,
nowhere was such an imprint left as in Nebraska, m,ostly to the detriment of subsequent political evolution.
George Norris, champion maverick of all time, managed to turn
Nebraska inside out during his boisterous life. He is remembered
fondly as a man whq turned the national spotlight on the Cornhusker
State (every year an attem.pt is mounted to change the nickname'to
something "less corny"), but the remnants of his tenure have crippled
politics there. Specifically, Norris ramrodded the non-partisan uni·
came1il1 Legislature into existence, just in time to call its first session to
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order in a monstrous new capitol'designed f~r a bicameral egislature.
(The other, chamber is used for committee meetings and a ditions of
.
:'
I
'
proposed state songs.)
Most politically aware Americans know that it.is called s~mply The
Unicameral. But seetingly no one is aware that the Unicamleral is nonI
partIsan.
.' 4
.
~
Unica~era:lism has worked quite well, and has m,uch to r ammend
it to the other 49 bicameral states. But non-partisanship as been a
disaster. Without a recognizable party leadership in the, egislature,
party platforms are meaningless, party structures often irr levant. In
fact; there often is no party structure to speak of between gu ernatorial
and!or Presidential elections, and gubernatoJial candidates h ve learned
to ru~ as semi-nan-partisan candidates, though tainted wi h a party
labeI.lWhile in most states the legislature is the breeding lround for
po~itical.l,ea.d~rs of stature, Ne~raska's Unicam.eral. has failed a produce
asmgle mdIVldual of CongressIOnal or Senatonal tImber.
.'
Original approval o~ the ~on-partisan legislature may ~ave been
somewhat freakish, sin~e Norris managed to include it on~ the same
ballot wit~ rep1al of Prohibition a~d appr?val of pari-mutue wagering.
But Once m, It !has proved almost ImpossIble to remove, th ugh some
stalwart souls are still trying.
'.
. Non-partisanship hC\S made it particularly difficult for thj" minority .
Democrats to mount an effective assault on the statehouse With no·
structur~ through which to present a party legislative platfo m and no
party lo~alists on legislative committees, it is virtually imp ssible for
the party, qua party, to have a voice in state affairs. The m jority Republicanscontinqe to control the Unicameral, though omewhat
nebulously, and alt!iances are fleeting and shifting, with little regarCl for
party lines.
II
.
With such min~cule possibilities for effective action th~ough the
party structure, it is little wonder that most Nebraskans Igreet the
prospect of invo~vement in partisan p~litics with a massive yawn. Even'
the state's heavily Democraticwards tend to elect Republica~s, and the
current: five-man Congressional delegation is probably the njlost rightwing in the nation.
I
.'
·Frank Morrison, ~ Democrat, managed to serve two terms a$ gove~nor
of the state, at least partly on the premise of preventing i'dirty' old,
partisan politics" from encrQaching into state government. ¥orr~on's
tenure in the statehouse left the party exactly as he had found it< . impotent. And Nebraska's organized Democrflts have subsisted through
o
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the long, 'lean years on little more than crumbs from Washington in
periods of pemocratic control of the White House and occasional infusions of money for national elections.
The Kennedy team built up the most effective force Qf Nebraska
Democrats in many years during the 1960 effort. But the results were
.so depressing that Robert Kennedy openly hoped he would never have
to set foot in Nebraska again. But times change, andRFK found him- .
self back eight y¢ars later, winning a new sort ~f primary election largely
in a vacuum, strtiggling against thesttaw man of non-candidate Johnson
and a McCarthy organization crippled by a negative balance In the
treasury and the wound inflicted lhe week before in Indiana. '
Nebraska's wide-open new primary law, untested before 1968, was
an offspring of the 1964 Goldwater campaign. In Neoraska., as elsewhere, Goldwater's more hydrophobic supporters raided the party
structure, stuffing caucuses and blitzing conventions until they had
wrested ·control. No deviation from orthodoxy was permitted. These
Goldwater tactics appalled a sizable number of the state's mild Re-'
publicans. They were moved to support a wide-open primary, making
control of the party machinery essentially irrelevant to Presidential
pblitics. The new law was written in such a way that the Secretary of
State was empowered to place on the ballot the names of all and sundry
who appeared to him to be genuine Presidential candidates, as well as
those who organized any kind of campaign effort in the state and' ~sked
to be added. Only a formal affidavit of non-candidacy could remove a -'
man's name. Only Nelson Rockefeller filed such an ·affidavit. '
The nuwber of delegates to the national convent' n was setin the
law at two for each of the three ,Congressional stricts, plus 22 ltt
large. On the eve of the election the McCarthy amp was uncertain
that they had enough' candidates for delegafe to. ake up a full fslate.
Filing fees had been paid by the organization for abo t half'of the\slate,
composed of a motley collection of coll~e students, teachers r and
housewives. Then true to fonn (the strange form of the McOarthy
campaign, that is) a .group of people rushed in at the'last minute to
file as delegates for McCarthy at the precise moment that I had filea
an exact full sl~te. I had hoped to limit McCarthy votes 'to pfecisely
right number of delegate candidates, a technique which had paid off ,
in New Hampshire. We therefore wound up with a surplus of ~andi· '
dates in the at-large category and in one Congressional district:
But to go back in time, the McCarthy effort began in earnest in
Nebraska after Blair Clark's initial January foray into the wilderness to

the
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line up something in the state. He found a grand total of ve people
, willing to meet with him, two of them journalists who .co ld not become actively committed, and one of them my wife. One the other
two was a political science professor, David Evens, then in he process
of being fired because of a controversy at his college. The last was a
graduate student at the University in Lincoln who had earli r rounded
up a group of concerned students.
._
Clark was utterly dismayed at his fi;st encounter with I ebraska'~
a~a~hy. He could not fin~ a singh~ leader with. any politicallexpercience
willmg and able to put hIS neck on the choppmg block for McCarthy.
Thus it quickly became apparent that one of the tiny gr I up would
have to do the job, and having no children and no 90ntrac al.obligations, 1 was the only one who could undertake the task of becoming
a full-time McCarthy worker in the state. Thus it was th t a transplanted New Mexican with only a year's exposure to N ebras a, and all,
of that in Omaha, became Executive Director of the yet to e formed
Nebraska McCarthy for President Committee.
Fille~with foreboding, I agreed to take on the job. It s emed the
least one could do at a time when others, parti9ularly the Sebatdr himself, were risking their· caree.rs for the kind of America we bblieved in.
I asked the McCarthy orgaJIlization to pay my regular salah' for the,
period, so that at least I would be secure from sudden econorrlic disast~r
during the campaign, should it fold suddenly (at that time it Jould have
folded any minute). Half the salary wa~ paid, the rest is still only a
promise. \
Promises were also tendered of substantial sums to organize the campaign. Instead, small sums~arrived months later, and promiSes of certain amounts by certain dates were uniformly shattered dreams. By the
time the first dribble of cash came in from Washington, I had already
used upa g9.0d deal of my initial salary on postage and minor expenditures. ObVIOusly, little could be done with no .initial capitalization.
What was done was largely through the efforts of a few local McCarthy
supporters, chief. among them Warren Buffett, son of an isolationalist
Republican congressman from Nebraska, who raised a few hundred
dollars.
:
Charged with finding ~ "name" chairman for the state organization,
. I beat innumerable bushes throughout the state, finding only bushes.
Offers of sub rosa help came from a few insiders in the political structure, but nothing public or tangible. The sam~ attitude was expressed
in countless ph~ne calls to my home. Cautious Omahans' called to say
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.. they wou14 like to help McCarthy, but feared their neighbors 'might
not understand.
.
. In due course, David Evans, a former member of Governor Mor- .
rison's staff and a talented if about-to-be-unemployed political scientist
hopes for a future in state politics, was appointed Sta.te Chairman.
Literally, I had no c;me else to anoint, despite Evans' lack of fame and/or
,notoriety.
.
The main' corps, of volunteers came, naturally, fr0Il?- the University
in Lincoln, augmented by a few troops from the traditionally phlegmatic small schools of Omaha. Leading th~ students and faculty memo
bers at Lincpln were Michael Oldfather, a graduate student who had
formed a Nebraska chapter of Concerned Democrats, and Gene' Pokorny, the talented vice president of the University's student government. As in other states, the hard, dirty work of the caplpaign was done
by students, who worked long hours with considerable verv~.
In Omaha, surprising numbers of people seemed to materialize out
of the atmosphere as.the McCarthy campaign became respectable, or
,.. almost so, after,New,Hampshire and Wisconsin. An office staff was.
organized and managed to do a creditable job with severely limited
materials and funds.
We rented a small office on the ground floor of Omaha's traditional
"political hotel," the decrepit and crumbling Sheraton-Fontenelle.
(Jack Bell, veteran' Associated Press political writer, once remarked to
me while traversing the catacombs of the Fontenelle, "Gad, I was in
this place two decades ago and jt hasn't changed at all.") From our fomby-four cubicle we enjoyed an excellent vantage point for observation
of the truoks enloading coffers of gold for tl;1e large Kennedy 'headquarters upstairs.
What monqy we were 'able to raise came in by dribbles. We pub- .
.lished 'the same ads in th~ daily papers which brought in tens of thousands of dollars in the East, such as the "Your Children Have Come
~ Home" spread Ificturing McCarthy with beaming youngsters. Apparently most Nebraskans would rather their children didn't come
home. The ads brought in far less than their cost: In fact, ads costing"
as much as $1,500 failed to bring in $100 in contributions; ther~by
astounding McCarthy workers from other states.
Occasionally a courageous N<:;braskan answered an' ad or ~'mailer"
in an affirmative way-we did get a few hundred resp?n~es.B,?t at l~ast
three-fourths of the response forms were returned wIth\ t~e contnbution" section scratched out, indicating a willingness tp support Me-
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earthy so long as it didn't cost money. A number of forms also indicated an intention to v~te for McCarthy in the primary, buti appended
"please do not telephone me."
. This sort of attitu'de totally befuddled McCarthy workers from the
national staff, most of whoIlil had never set foot in the Midwest before"
much less in Nebraska. None of thtraditional methods of campaigning evoked tqe normal responses.eteransof the New, Hampshire
and Wisconsin enthusiasm found t. emselves, like fish out of water, in
the nation's leading hotbed of apathy. Yet curiously, the same national
campaign thinkers who had laid out McCarthy's unorthodox approach·
to politics attempted to attack the Nebraskaproblem through orthodox
techniques, leading to a predictable and resounding failur¢.
Actually, it may be true that Nebraska was .fpredoom d by McCarthy's defeat ,in Indiana. Coming only a week before th Nebraska
election, Indiana had exhaustea the campaign's resource of both
money and energy. None of the more experienced worke could be
spared for Nebraska until the fiHal wc:;ek, an'd promises of fin ncial help
were repeatedly broken. It may seem strange that money would ,be
promised, in definite amounts on definite dates,.when there was absolutely no certainty that it could be delivered. But the MCCilr thy campaign has been like that from the beginning, leading to co siderable
consternation among local leaders (such as myself) who h d gone in
debt on the basis of such promises.
Besides the utter lack of financial resources-only $2,ooo:had been
sent:to Nebraska ptfore the final days of the camp~ign.we ijound.ourselves totally unde staffed, ,:ithout sig~~can.t outside assist$nce until
the very last week. of the pnmary campaIgn, when workers Were freed
from Indiana.
Strangely, these ~orkers turned out to be almost entirely ~rom New
England, and they shared a near-total lack of cOIT).prehension ;of the
Nebraska situation. An attempt was made to organize the wo~king-class
wards of South Omaha 01;1 the same basis as New Britain, C.omnecticut,
with'disastrous results,. The same "organizer" managed to pqison relations with a local C(mgressional candidate by getting involve8 ina dispute over a storehont office, meanwhile spending cash on thdusands of
McCarthy yard signs which blew away in Nebraska's strongspiing
winds:
.
Student organizers sent' in to "take over" -the local operati~n did jU'st
that, driving out the local students who .had thought themselves i~
control. An entire cadre, <;If hard-working high school studen~s was ef-
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fectively offen d and sent home by the imported student leaders.
Some joined t Kennedy camp, where they ~ound that local people
were treated in
even more high-handed fashion. The young people
brought into N raska from past campaigns ~lso adopted a working
schedule which ften called for sleeping until noon and doing most of
their work betwe 1'1 10 p.m. and 4 a.m. Needless to say, such operative
techniques ~re not particularly effective in a community which rolls
up the sidewalks at9 p.m.
- •
Yet despite th~ many mistakes made in the Nebraska campaign
(item: Ii was called at 7 a.m. one morning by a mall' who wanted to
know w~at I planned to do with the rented airplane he had wanning
up on the runway-someone had forgotten he had rented it), a good
deal of optimism continued to warm the hearts of the Nebraska crew.
McCarthy seemed like a natural in Nebraska, on paper. From nearby
Minnesota, he had an outstanding record in most of the fields of tradi·
tional interest to the state: agriculture, economics, regional development, etc. It seemed difficult to imagine how Nebraska voters could
prefer Robert Kennedy over Gene McCarthy, and we thought we had
uncovered considerable anti-Kennedy feeling in the state.
We had. But it was confined largely "to Republicans. And it 'should
not have been forgotten that Nebraska's farmers are virtually 100%
Republican. The state's Democrats are mainly in the Omaha-Lincoln
metropolitan areas and are almost entirely working-class or lower-miqdleclass, largely uninformed, hawkish on the war and quietly racist,
as well as intensely contemptuous of "intellectuals."
The primary campaign of 1968 revealed, in state after state, that
McCarthy's support would come largely from middle-class segments
of society, where education and economic security are major factors,
and where support fqr the war is negligible. Nor did it seem likely to
the casual observer that Robert Kennedy could ,reach the lower-class
ethnic groups on both sides of the color barricade. But he could and did,
for a varietY of reasons, mo~t of them -involved with the' Kennedy
"mystique."
.
As a result of the historical process described above, Nebraska lacks
'the elements of the population which produced massive votes for McCarthy-in other states. Curt Gans recognized the nature of the situation
to some cixtent, and ordered an expensive advertising and canvassing
campaign aimed at'c;:onvincing Republicans to re-register as Democrats
for the primary.!
Predictably though unfortunately the cross-registration effort came
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to little. I doubt if more than a few hundred Republicansl!re-registe~ed
in the entire state, though many of them expressed a preference for McCarthyand they did, not have an exciting contest in the~r own party
(Reagan did get a surprisingly large turnout as a non-can~idate). For
in Nebraska, Republicanism runs deep. There are still sma~towns and
certain strata ot society in larger towns where it is not so ially acceptable to be anything but a Republican. It is unthinkable an utterly
foreign notion-for these people to register as Democrats, ven'tor two
weeks.
I
If my retrospective assessment of the situation in Nelfraska is accurate, McCa~thy probably did slightly better than anyon9 had a right
,to expect. He-polled more than 20% of the vote in a th~ee-way race
.' against .Robert.Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson. The fact t~at a fifth of
the state~s ordinarily highly-conservative Democrats casf th~ir votes for
the most unusual and perhaps the most radical candidate to present himself in a generation indicates a depth of restlessness and ~ desire for
'- change that" transposed to the nati~mal level, becomes highly signifi-

cant.·

I

,

I

'

Though it would be totally irrational to assume thatt'lMcCarthy
might have found a way to win in Nebraska, I think that he ,ight have
done better with a more e£!icit;lntly organized and finance camp?ign,
even though I am not convinced that campaign organ~'ions make
much difference. It is a cliche that 90% of what one does in campaign
is irrelevant-the prob!em being that you nev~r know wh ch ten per
cent is significant. In general; voters could not care less hO~ brilliantly
you think your campaign strategy is organized, or wheth r you have
just the right personnel in the right slots. Rather, they r act to the
candidate and the image he projects. This of course involves ~dvertising,
but probably much more important is the manner'in whicH the candidate comes across in newspaper articles and television new~programs.
The most arduous campaigner can never shake the hand of ~very voter,
even in a very small state. He reaches more voters in a two-rniinute news '
broadcast than he can in a month of campaigning on foot.
Thus the breakdown of traditional organizational methods in the
Nebraska McCarthy campaign had little impact. Since IliO one was
watching, the public hardly m'ssed it. But a series of foul-ups in scheduling and programming may ave weakened a potentially helpful adverti~ing program.
The first maneuver of McC rthy'snational staff on landipg in a new
primary state has usually been 0 try to displace the local or~anization.
-
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It happened in Wisconsin, it happened in Indiana and Nebraska, 'and
when I got to Oregon I found the State Chairman wandering about
aimlessly, wondering what was going on. But this displacement process
may be endemic in political campaigns, and the Kennedy,people had a
reputation for being particularly abrupt and brutal about it. The na·
tional staff always considers that It knows better than the local crew.
Sometimes it does.
'
However, the chief result of the chaos created in Nebraska, which
~eatured an abrupt shift of the state office to Lincoln and.a dispersal of
authority to vague sources, was to leave scheduling in total wreckage.
By the Sunday before the Nebraska vote, I found that, several key men
in the local TV industry had become so ~ildered by incomprehen.
sible sched~e changes that they refused to believe anything handed out
py the McCarthy organization. One station, tired of appearing at places
where McCarthy did not, folded up its equipment and stomped out of
a press conference vowing never to return.
Carefully cultivated 'relations with the printed press in Nebraska
. were shc{t~~d. by the national staff in the last week. The local crew,
particularly
State Chairman and myself, had outlined a series of appearances fbrthe Senator aimed at maximum exposure in areas of population concentration. Eventually the imported staff wound up follow·
ing essentially the ~ame eOlltfe, but ~nly after so many revisions an~
so much rescheduhng that tbe resultmg exposure was far less than it
might have been.
. ' ,
Of course no, one can ever be certain 'about such things. But it is a
fact that McCarthy got inferior exposute in'Nebraska, and much of the
press material turned out was' the tradilltonal political bornbast already
.,..rejected by the candidate himself as useless. He has said repeatedly that
his essential campaign technique has been to "walk around and let the
people look at us." Perhaps if he had done just that, and kept his un·
controllable staff and its internal warfare out of the state, he might have
done better.
"
Surveying the wreckage after the primary, I found that the office
crews imported from New England had actually thrown out mail con·
~aining requests for information and -some conifibutions, saying they
had no time to open it. Rented Hertz cars we~left in the Avis ,lot"
incredible hotel bills were run up where inexpensive housing was avail·
able, and I spent at least a week tracking down lost cars. I never did find
out just why that airplane was rented,
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Oregon was a very different story. While there, I Gould srrell impending victory in the air. M~Carthy actually drew large~ crow~s than Kennedy-that's the sort ·of state it is. In Oregon, th~ ,natioJllal sta,ff was
notable largely by its absence, as most had gone oil to !plunge into
California's own intermimible internal warfare. The Oregon campaign
turned out to be the sort of quiet, sensihfecampaign I 'Would have
liked to see in Nebraska, But Oregon had a large and prosperous local
McCarthy or§anization, sa,mething unthinkable in Nebras~a, and a receptive population. Conditions were strikingly different.
.In Californ~a, sq~a:bbl~s .and internal. dissensi.on ~~gaim preva~leL.
_ Smce Northern Cahformans hate Southern Cahfoquans, and sm
the Los Angeles liberal Democrats have been fighting each other for .
years, the situation rapidly deteriorated into a chaos ~eyond the com- .
prehension of the most astute veteran of political reporting. There has
never been anything like the logic-defying madhouse:set up in Westwood Village, where thousands of people wandered in and about at all
, hours, 'carting tremendous mountains of peanut butter sandwiches
through a forest of telephone lines, plywood planks, and exhausted
teenies asleep on tables. The fact that McCarthy did So well in C~lifor
nia (though the extent of his performance w.as instantly for'gotten in
the national emotional catharsis of the next few days) is indicative of
the axiom that campaign organizations, or at leasttheir outward manifestations, are irrelevartt to Presidential politics. Though McCarthy was
unable to gain much support from the Negro anq. Mexican population
of California· (the're are more IVlexic~ms in Los Angeles than there are
people in Nebraska), he almost won the election-meanibg that he
carried the white middleclass suburbs by landslide margins.. .
And therein lies the message and the portent of the Mcqarthy' campaign. It is significant that some of the same people who a~e attracted
to McCarthy might in othd circumstances gravitate to Ceorge Wallace
(many polls have indicated this). It is ev'ident that.a large segment of
the mClst broadly represent tive elements of the population is looking
for an alternative to the pre ent system of politics in the country.
It is
more
than the war. ar more, It is more 'than the di~cult state
I
•
of the economy or the pro lems of the cities. What .has h' ppened is ..
that much of, America feel adrift in the politics of the 20 h century,
There. is a despair"that poli ical activity as we have known i ~eems no
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longer to be relevant to the world about ps. The average citizen can
find no way to affect the political process in which he is inextrir::ably
,enmeshed.
McCarthy has brought these Americans a resurrection of confidence
in the ability of the nation to respond in a rational fashion to the wisHes
of her people. He' has shown that it'is possible for people, instead of institutions and interest groups, to influence the course of evept~ has
, ,re~humanized politics.
./ '":'
If I am not wrong, historians of the future will look back at the 20th
century and note that its greatest problem was the loss of identity in an
age of unbounded technological proliferation-the point in time when
men began to have serious doubts that they were capable of controlling
the society they had created. By reintroduGjng calm reason and personal
courage, Gene McCarthy has given many of us a new lease on life, made
it once again exciting to bean American~
,
Andas McCarthy hafsb often point~d out, the national hunger for
a new politics, a politics of decentralization and grass-roots qemocracy,
is not his creation. He has come to symbolize the movement, but he did
not invent it and he is not necessarily its leader. It is leader-less".ipa
sense, because it is so difficultto articulate.
'
_:,_,,.}
,Whether 'Mc;Carthy is nominated for fbePresidency
not,
s
will never be the same again. There are now thousands' 'an ho sands
of Americans who have been to their first precinct caucu ,th r first
state party convention. Many will be going to the national!
vention
this year for the first time. Some have become officers in their local and
state party structures. It is inconceivable that these thousands of par·
ticipants in the "new politics" will fold their tents and go home after a
setbacK. Such a rejuvenation of politics is still mystifymg to the country's professional politicians, but they will soon come face to face with
it in their own bailiwicks. I suspect we will not see many of them back
at the 1972 national convention.
As I write, the polls continue to indicate an outpouring of grass-roots
support for McCarthy through<!lut the country. Nothing like ithas ever
happened before. Willkie's nomination pales by comparison. The les·
son is that the·country is ready and anxious, to try something new-to
move in new directions and attempt to construct a place in the world
that is. consistent with our traditional notions of liberal democracy and
'the demands of today's w~rld. This~s a challenge to make America into
what we have claimed it to be, and ~ challenge to the Democratic Party
and the nation.
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